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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Alexander Michael Mitchell appeals from his judgment of conviction for grand theft by
possession of stolen property. Mr. Mitchell was convicted following a jury trial, and the district
court imposed a sentence of seven years, with three and one-half years determinate.
Mr. Mitchell appeals, and he asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In this case, the State alleged that Mr. Mitchell, an employee at a restaurant, took a
customer's credit card account number and then used it to make an unauthorized purchase. (See
generally, Tr.) Mr. Mitchell was charged with grand theft by possession of a stolen financial

transaction card account number as follows:
That the Defendant, ALEXANDER MICHAEL MITCHELL, on or about the 23 rd
day of June, 2018, in Kootenai County, Idaho, did wrongfully take, obtain, and/or
withhold the property of another, to-wit: Lagonda McDonald, and where the
property consists of a financial transaction card account number, all of which is
contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and
provided and against the peace and dignity of the people of the State ofldaho.
(R., pp.46-47.) However, the charge was subsequently amended by the State and Mr. Mitchell
went to trial on the following charge:
That the Defendant, ALEXANDER MICHAEL MITCHELL, on or about the 23 rd
day of June, 2018, in Kootenai County, Idaho, did knowingly receive or possess a
financial transaction card account number belonging to Lagonda McDonald,
either knowing the property was stolen by another or under such circumstances as
would reasonably induce the defendant to believe the property was stolen and
where the property was in fact stolen and the defendant had the intent to deprive
the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property; or the defendant
knowingly used the property in such manner as to deprive the owner permanently
of the use or benefit of the property all of which is contrary to the form, force and
effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and
dignity of the people of the State ofldaho.
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(R., pp.149-50.)

Accordingly, the jury instructions required the jury to find the following

elements:
1. On or about June 23rd, 2018;
2. in the State ofldaho;
3. the defendant, ALEXANDER MITCHELL, knowingly received or possessed a
financial transaction card account number belonging to Lagonda McDonald;
4. either knowing the property was stolen by another or under such circumstances
as would reasonably induce the defendant to believe the property was stolen;
5. such property was in fact stolen; [and]
6. the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the use or
benefit of the property; or the defendant knowingly used the property in such
manner as to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property;
and the property was the account number of a financial transaction card.
(R., pp.189-90.)
At trial, Lagonda McDonald testified that on June 20, 2018, she had lunch with friends at
a restaurant called Radicci's. (Tr., p.142, Ls.9-24.) She identified Mr. Mitchell as her server at
the restaurant and testified that he seemed nervous while serving them. (Tr., p.143, L.17 - p.144,
L.22.) She paid for lunch with her credit card, which had her residence as the billing address.
(Tr., p.145, Ls.2-15.) On June 23, 2018, Ms. McDonald was contacted by her bank and was
informed of purchases that she did not make. (Tr., p.148, Ls.6-17.) She then cancelled her credit
card. (Tr., p.151, Ls.7-10.)
Daniel Morey, the owner of the restaurant, testified next. He testified that Mr. Mitchell
was his employee, and the State used Mr. Morey to introduce a video showing Mr. Mitchell
running the credit card. (State's Exhibit 2.) The video shows Mr. Mitchell using his cell phone
while running the card. (State's Exhibit 2.) The State's theory was that Mr. Mitchell took a
picture of the card. (See generally, Tr.) The State then introduced a business record from Yeti
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indicating that Ms. McDonald's card was used to purchase several items totaling $119.97, and
that the shipping name and address were Mr. Mitchell's. (Tr., p.217, L.15 - p.219, L.10.) The
State never recovered or searched Mr. Mitchell's cell phone, nor did they ever find the Yeti
products. (Tr., p.226, Ls.1-17.)
Mr. Mitchell made a motion for a judgment of acquittal following the State's case.
(Tr. p.238, Ls.16-24.) Mr. Mitchell acknowledged that he may be guilty ofpetit theft or criminal
possession of a financial transaction card number, but he asserted that he was not guilty of grand
theft. (Tr., p.239, Ls.5-16.) He argued that the State failed to meet elements 4 and 5 of the jury
instruction, requiring that Mr. Mitchell either knew the property was stolen by another or under
such circumstances as would reasonably induce the defendant to believe the property was stolen,
and that the property was in fact stolen.

(Tr., p.239, Ls.17-23; R., pp.189-90.)

The court

reserved ruling on the motion but denied the motion without analysis following the verdict.
(Tr., p.253, Ls.24-25; p.320, L.13 - p.321, L.9.)
The district court imposed a sentence of seven years, with three and one-half years
determinate.

(R., p.241.)

Mr.

Mitchell appealed.

(R., p.256.)

He asserts that there is

insufficient evidence to support his conviction and the district court therefore erred by denying
his motion for a judgment of acquittal.
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ISSUE
Is there insufficient evidence to support Mr. Mitchell's conviction for grand theft by possession
of stolen property?
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ARGUMENT
There Is Insufficient Evidence To Support Mr. Mitchell's Conviction For Grand Theft By
Possession Of Stolen Property
A.

Introduction
Mr. Mitchell submits that the state submitted insufficient evidence to support his

conviction for grand theft by possession of stolen property.

B.

There Is Insufficient Evidence To Support Mr. Mitchell's Conviction For Grand Theft By
Possession Of Stolen Property
"This Court will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict,

where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that
the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285 (2003). "Evidence is substantial if a
reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point
of fact has been proven." State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015). A conviction can be
based primarily upon circumstantial evidence, State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50-51 (1969), and
"even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a finding of
innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable
inferences of guilt," State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712 (2009).
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 provides that when a verdict of guilty is returned, the court, on
motion of the defendant, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal if the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense. The test applied when reviewing the district
court's ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is to determine whether the evidence was
sufficient to sustain a conviction of the crime charged. State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 912-13
(1995). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence where a judgment of conviction has
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been entered upon a jury verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict if
there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998).
The appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of
the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence.

State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684 (Ct. App. 1985). The evidence is

considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385.
Additionally, "statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 748 (2012). When a question
before this Court requires statutory interpretation, this Court applies the following principles:
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative
body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in
the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole,
and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute
so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language
is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction.

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho
307, 310 (2009) (internal citations omitted)).
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the jury was instructed on the following elements
of grand theft in this case:
1. On or about June 23rd, 2018;
2. in the State ofldaho;
3. the defendant, ALEXANDER MITCHELL, knowingly received or possessed a
financial transaction card account number belonging to Lagonda McDonald;
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4. either knowing the property was stolen by another or under such circumstances
as would reasonably induce the defendant to believe the property was stolen;
5. such property was in fact stolen; [and]
6. the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the use or
benefit of the property; or the defendant knowingly used the property in such
manner as to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property;
and the property was the account number of a financial transaction card.
(R., pp.189-90.) Mr. Mitchell asserts that the State failed to produce evidence on elements 4 and
5.
First, the State was required to produce evidence that Mr. Mitchell received or possessed
the account number "either knowing that the property was stolen by another or under such
circumstances that would reasonably induce him to believe that the property was stolen."
(R., p.189.) There is no evidence of that in this record. The property was certainly not stolen by
another. There is no evidence, and the State never asserted, that anyone other than Mr. Mitchell
was involved in the taking of the card number. 1 There is also no evidence that Mr. Mitchell

1

The "by another" language is no longer in the grand theft statute. Idaho Code section 182403(4) provides:
A person commits theft when he knowingly receives, retains, conceals, obtains
control over, possesses, or disposes of stolen property, knowing the property to have
been stolen or under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe
that the property was stolen, and
(a) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property;
or
(b) Knowingly uses, conceals or abandons the property in such manner as to
deprive the owner permanently of such use or benefit; or
(c) ) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use, concealment or
abandonment probably will deprive the owner permanently of such use or
benefit.
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received or possessed the property under circumstances where he would reasonably believe the
property was stolen. By its terms, this element does not apply to the person that actually takes
the property - the initial thief either knows the property is stolen or not; they do not possess
property under circumstances where they "reasonably believe" the property was stolen.

A

different subsection of the theft statute applies to a person who wrongfully takes property, as
opposed to the person that possesses stolen property. Idaho Code sections 18-2403(1) and (2)
apply to the person who has "wrongfully" taken, obtained, or withheld property from another.
However, Mr. Mitchell was not charged with wrongfully taking, obtaining, or withholding the
card number. In this case, there is simply no evidence that Mr. Mitchell received or possessed
property "either knowing that the property was stolen by another or under such circumstances
that would reasonably induce him to believe that the property was stolen."
Second, there is no evidence of element 5, that the account number was "stolen." The
jury was instructed that "stolen property" meant "property over which control has been obtained
by theft." (R., p.196.) The jury was further instructed that a person steals property when that
person "wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds" property from another. Assuming all of the
State's evidence to be true, Mr. Mitchell simply took a photograph of a credit card. Mr. Mitchell
submits that this number has not been "stolen." Ms. McDonald had possession of both her card
and card number when Mr. Mitchell returned the card at the restaurant and thus has not taken,

The "by another" language was stricken in 2001. However, this does not change Mr. Mitchell's
argument. The Statement of Purpose for the change stated, "this legislation will clarify Idaho
Code, section 18 2403, by striking superfluous language." 2001 Idaho Law Ch.112 (H.B. 244).
Thus, the legislature did not intend to give the statute a new meaning. It simply felt "by another"
was superfluous. Thus, the statute still requires that, for grand theft by possession, the defendant
come into property that has already been stolen. And, in any event, the State charged
Mr. Mitchell, and the jury was instructed, that the property needed to be stolen "by another."
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obtained, or withheld the number from her. Mr. Mitchell submits that if property could be taken,
obtained, or withheld by taking a photograph, it could be done simply by memorizing a number
as well. This is simply not theft.
However, as he did in district court, Mr. Mitchell acknowledges that his alleged actions,
assuming them to be true, could constitute a crime. (Tr., p.239, Ls.5-16.) Idaho Code section
18-3125(1) provides that it is a felony "[t]o acquire [a financial transaction card] or [financial
transaction card] number from another without the consent of the card holder or the issuer with
the intent to use to defraud, or to, with the knowledge that it has been so acquired, receive an
FTC or FTC number with the intent to use to defraud, or to sell, or to transfer the FTC or FTC
number to another person with the knowledge that it is to be used to defraud." I.C. § 18-3125(1).
Mr. Mitchell submits that the charge of criminal possession of a fmancial transaction number is
the appropriate charge in circumstances such as this one.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Mitchell requests that his conviction be vacated.
DATED this 10th day of December, 2019.

/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of December, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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